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1. Introduction 
The past decade has seen major restructuring in the European banking industry partly as a 
result of the recent financial crisis. In order to provide financial support to the distressed financial 
sector, EU member states introduced a number of emergency measures ranging from state guarantee 
schemes, to public recapitalizations, forced takeovers and acquisitions, and nationalizations 
(Petrovic and Tusch, 2009). We investigate the likelihood of a listed bank either becoming involved 
in a takeover as a target or being (privately or publicly) recapitalized in the periods before and 
during the financial crisis. Because takeovers and recapitalizations are potential alternatives to shore 
up financial institutions, we compare the determinants of a bank being taken over with those of a 
bank being recapitalized. Our results show that takeovers are more likely than private 
recapitalizations for banks when their distress concerns traditional banking activities. Our evidence 
provides a tool for prudential supervision by identifying characteristics that will enable supervisory 
authorities to forecast the most likely outcome (takeover vs. recapitalization) and national 
governments/supervisory authorities to engineer recapitalizations in the case of state bailouts.  
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) examine the characteristics that make banks more likely to 
disappear through either failures or acquisitions, whilst De Young (2003) examines the 
characteristics that make banks more likely to disappear via failures1. In contrast, we focus on the 
ex-ante characteristics that make banks more likely either to disappear as independent entities 
through takeovers or to survive through recapitalizations in the EU banking industry both before and 
during the crisis. Takeovers and recapitalizations are potential alternatives to shore up financial 
institutions although in different ways. A takeover involves a change in control, possibly new 
management, and the end of the bank as an independent entity. A recapitalization involves the sale 
                                               
1
 Cole and White (2012) examine the same issue over the 2007-08 crisis. 
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of new equity in the bank to investors in the market or to a government entity without the loss of 
independence. Although the characteristics of banks involved in acquisitions have been thoroughly 
researched2, to our knowledge no published empirical work investigates how these characteristics 
differ in the pre-crisis and crisis periods3. Furthermore, whilst the literature on the characteristics of 
banks involved in public recapitalizations (especially via the Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP) 
is growing (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2012; ap Gwilym et al. 
2013; Harris et al. 2013; Elyasiani et al. 2014; Duchin and Sosyura 2014; Molyneux et al. 2014)4, 
there is surprisingly little evidence on the characteristics of banks that are privately recapitalized 
(Dinger and Vallascas, 2015)5. Further, no evidence exists on how these characteristics differ 
between takeovers and recapitalizations6.  
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that the most common reasons given for bank takeovers 
are the aim to better manage the assets of poorly managed banks, the desire to grow, or the desire of 
bank managers with a large ownership stake to be acquired in the hope of receiving an attractive 
takeover premium. Berger et al. (2014) and Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that the most common 
reasons given for bank recapitalizations are the need to revive the banks, the need to reduce risk 
                                               
2
 Moore, 1997; Hadlock et al., 1999; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Hannan and Pilloff, 2009; Goddard et al., 2009; 
Hernando et al. 2009; Pasiouras et al. 2011; Beccalli and Frantz 2013. 
3
 For the US, there is evidence on the ex-post effects on market performance of acquirers in the resolution of failed 
banks during the crisis (Cowan and Salotti, 2013), and on the impact of disclosure requirements in the acquisition of 
undercapitalized banks promoted and subsidized by governments (Granja, 2011). 
4
 Evidence is provided on the ex-post effects of government assistance on bank risk taking (for the US see Duchin and 
Sosyura, 2014; for Germany see Gropp et al. 2014), on the effects on bank risk taking and liquidity creation following 
regulatory interventions and capital support (Berger et al. 2014).  
5
 The literature provides evidence on the effects on bank performance (survival and market share) associated with capital 
during the crisis (Berger et al. 2013), whilst not specifically on the ex-ante determinants of capital injections. The non-
banking literature has instead extensively investigated the most common reasons given for private recapitalizations (see 
for a review Eckbo et al. 2007). 
6
 Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) estimate a multinomial logistic regression to differentiate among the forms of 
public resolutions (public recapitalizations, forced takeovers and nationalizations), but they ignore private interventions 
(private takeovers and recapitalizations, where our paper focuses). 
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taking7, or to create liquidity8, which is a core function of banks. In this industry nevertheless banks 
take steps to limit the use of equity as much as possible because banks perceive equity financing as 
expensive. Indeed, a primary challenge for capital regulation is forcing banks to hold more equity 
than they would like (Kashyap et al. 2008).  
For poorly performing banks, which are therefore potentially subject to bank runs especially 
in the crisis period, takeovers have several advantages over private recapitalizations. First, equity 
investors in a bank are not capable of monitoring the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, they constantly worry that bad decisions by management will dissipate the value of their 
shareholdings. This was especially important in the case of a bank badly managed in the past 
(Kashyap et al. 2008): the high level of discretion that an equity-rich balance sheet granted to bank 
management explains the cost-of-capital premium and the preference for takeovers rather than 
further capital injections in badly managed banks. Second, under the debt overhang framework 
(Myers, 1977), existing shareholders might not benefit from new capital injections because most of 
the benefits might go to existing creditors, especially when the equity capital is low (Admati et al. 
2012; Elyasiani et al. 2014).  
Furthermore, in an emergency context in which the time required to solve the bank’s distress 
is a primary issue due to systemic risk, state recapitalizations appear preferable to private 
recapitalizations. They tend to be quicker, whilst private recapitalizations tend to be sluggish due to 
higher coordination costs and higher information asymmetries faced by small shareholders. In such a 
context of high information asymmetry, the state is expected to be better able to evaluate the quality 
of a counterpart bank than small shareholders, which should reduce the adverse selection problem 
faced by the small shareholders (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In addition, capital is a relatively costly 
                                               
7
 See among the others the theoretical models of: Bhattacharya et al. (1998); Diamond and Rajan (2005); Allen et al. 
(2011); and Philippon and Schnabl (2013).  
8
 See among the others theoretical models: Bryant (1980); Diamond and Dybvig (1983); Kashyap et al. (2002). 
  
 
 
6
mode of funding at all times, and it becomes particularly costly during times of great uncertainty 
(Kashyap et al. 2008) given the higher concerns among private investors for bank failures 
(Okonkwo Osili and Paulson, 2009). Finally, a state recapitalization is less likely to involve 
information leakages to depositors and thus less likely to lead to bank runs. This explains why 
government intervention during crises has driven the recapitalizations aimed at restructuring in order 
to avoid contagion (UK House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009). 
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the characteristics that determine the likelihood 
of banks becoming targets or being recapitalized, by using (static and sequential) multinomial 
logistic and Cox regressions. With reference to the EU banking industry, our results show that if we 
consider takeovers and recapitalizations as potential alternatives for restructuring banks, private 
recapitalizations are more likely for banks with less tangible equity but with higher net interest 
margins and positive growth, and bank takeovers are more likely when their distress concerns low 
net interest margins that reflect weak performance in traditional banking activities. However, the 
determinants differ widely between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Whilst few differences arise in 
the pre-crisis period, major differences emerge during the crisis period. The major difference is that 
a bank’s net interest margin adversely affects the likelihood of being taken over, and the magnitude 
of tangible equity adversely affects the likelihood of being recapitalized but the net interest margin 
and growth positively affects the likelihood of being recapitalized. These findings suggest that the 
main motivation for takeovers is to improve one specific dimension of operating performance (that 
is the profitability of the traditional banking activity). However, for private recapitalizations, the 
main motivation is to reduce risk (risk taking hypothesis through solvency risk) in presence of better 
operating performance. Further, a higher likelihood of going through a public recapitalization is 
associated with lower liquidity, larger size, and higher growth at the bank level but lower growth at 
the country level. In summary, there is a market for corporate control when the performance of the 
traditional banking activity is lower, whereas the search for stability explains recapitalizations (and 
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within recapitalizations, the state intervention occurs in more difficult situations,  in which the 
private solution is not possible).  
Our evidence on equity and liquidity supports the view of the Basel III Committee that 
macro-prudential regulation should require banks to hold higher levels of capital (not only to reduce 
the likelihood of a bank requiring a bailout, but also to reduce the capital transfer to and from the 
government and the cost of such an intervention)  and should impose the liquidity coverage ratio and 
the net stable funding ratio (to address the issue of maturity mismatch in the short and medium term, 
with the aim to reduce the probability and cost of public recapitalizations). A strong normative 
implication however cannot be derived in the absence of a welfare analysis that weighs the costs of 
higher levels of capital and liquidity. Further, we find that the adverse effect of liquidity is greater 
for larger banks, which means that the larger the size in relation to liquidity the higher the likelihood 
of a state bailout. This is clearly in line with the current discussion on too big to fail. 
Section 2 describes the methodology, the sample, and the data sources. Section 3 provides 
the empirical evidence, whereas section 4 introduces robustness tests. Section 5 provides a 
conclusion.  
2. Methodology 
2.1. A static model 
To identify the determinants of recapitalizations and takeovers, we use a multi-period, 
multinomial logistic regression. We use a multi-period logistic regression to take into account the 
fact that recapitalizations and takeovers are relatively uncommon events (see Shumway, 2001; 
Pagano et al., 1998; Chava and Jarrow, 2004). This regression, also known as multinomial logit, 
explains the likelihood of an event taking place as a function of a vector of independent covariates X 
and parameters , with the cumulative distribution function being the logistic distribution function.9 
                                               
9
 In order to test the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, we conduct the Hausman test: in all cases, we 
could not reject the null hypothesis of independence of the outcomes from other alternatives (p-values equal to 1.0): this 
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Equation (1) introduces the multinomial response variable, Yt, that indicates the occurrence of an 
event in a distinct time interval that ranges from zero to T and the constant, , that defines the risk in 
the case of X=0: 
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where i=1 represents the event of becoming a target, i=2 represents the event of being privately 
recapitalized, i=3 represents the event of being publicly recapitalized, and i=0 represents the event of 
being uninvolved in a recapitalization or takeover. The ),1( #−= tiYp t  represents the probability 
that Yt = i at date t is conditional on the information set available at date t-1. 
Following Palepu (1986), the selection of variables is based on prespecified hypotheses on what 
banks are likely to become involved in takeovers and recapitalizations. Table 1 summarizes the 
hypotheses, their variables, and expected signs. The hypotheses are as follows: 
1. the operating performance hypothesis, tested by the profitability of operating activities 
(ROA), the profitability of the traditional banking activity (NIM), the free cash flow 
return (FCFR), the cost-to-income ratio (CTI), and the growth in total assets over the last 
year (GROWTH); 
2. the risk taking hypothesis, tested by insolvency risk (proxied by the amount of tangible 
equity over total assets, EQUITY; here higher values of equity imply lower insolvency 
risk),  credit risk (proxied by the amount of net charge off over total assets, NCO), and 
liquidity risk  (proxied by the amount of liquid assets over total assets, LIQ); 
3. control variables: 
                                                                                                                                                             
allowed us to use the multinomial logistic regression as the baseline model. An alternative to the logistic regression is 
the probit regression, which uses a normal cumulative distribution function. Probit regressions however produce results 
that are very similar to logistic regression in binary cases. As a robustness test, we use the probit regression and obtain 
qualitatively similar results. These robustness tests are available from the authors on request. 
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- size, tested by the natural logarithm of total assets (LNTA); 
- market reward, tested by the change in the market price (return) of the bank over the 
last year (PRICE_CH); 
- regulatory/macroeconomic setting, tested by the level of economic freedom 
(EC_FREE) and regulatory quality (REG_Q) of the country where each bank 
operates, the size of the national banking system where each bank operates 
(CLAIMS), the geographical location of each bank (EU) and the level of GDP 
growth of each country (GDPG). 
The first hypothesis is the operating performance hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that 
banks might use takeovers to generate increases in profits and value (Wheelock and Wilson 2000; 
Hernando et al. 2009). However, recapitalizations might be more likely in the presence of better 
operating performance and growth (either by expanding market power or by achieving economies of 
scale) that could encourage investors to subscribe to the new equity issues. One of the main motives 
underlying takeovers is to improve the operating performance of the target, and these gains are more 
likely to be achievable if the target bank is underperforming. Therefore, indicators of operating 
performance should contain explanatory power on the likelihood of being acquired: banks with 
lower operating performance might be more attractive for takeovers. Overall, bad operating 
performance reflects either managerial inefficiency (Hannan and Rhoades 1987), or adverse 
economic conditions and other factors outside management control (such as inflation and GDP 
growth) or the bank risk taking (risk features of the bank assets). The lower profitability of operating 
activities (ROA) and the higher cost inefficiency (CTI) tend to suggest the failure of managers to 
maximize a firm’s value, which drives their replacement via the takeover mechanism (Palepu 1986). 
Profitability from traditional banking (NIM) focuses on the traditional operations of the banks and is 
intended to reflect the exercise of market power and/or its effect on operational efficiency (Berger et 
al. 2004). Although NIM can be considered a reflection of managerial inefficiency in lending and 
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borrowing activities, it can also vary depending on the risk features of the bank’s assets (loans) and 
the economic environment (banks operating in countries with higher competition, lower inflation, 
and lower growth also typically have lower net interest margins). As for the free-cash-flow return 
(FCFR), firms that overinvest are likely to be targets because acquiring firms can make better 
investment decisions (Jensen 1986): banks that tend to overinvest tend to invest in negative NPV 
projects and therefore are more likely to be taken over. Slower growing targets might be more 
attractive to acquirers looking to increase the target’s growth rate (Moore, 1996; Pasiouras et al., 
2011). 
The second hypothesis is on risk taking and has three dimensions. The solvency risk 
dimension derives from the financial fragility theory (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; 2001) that argues 
that a highly levered capital structure in banks makes them fragile and subject to runs, therefore 
governments might be able to use recapitalizations to reduce this fragility. Moreover, according to 
the theories on the strengthening of banks’ monitoring incentives (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; 
Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2011; Mehran and Thakor, 2011), recapitalizations might reduce 
banks’ risk taking. Also, according to the theory of debt overhang (Myers, 1977), highly levered 
banks should be unwilling to issue new equity because most of the benefits go to the existing 
creditors (Admati et al, 2012). The credit risk dimension affects the banks’ operating performance in 
the traditional banking activity, and thus is one of the main motives underlying takeovers. The 
liquidity risk dimension comes from the theories on the banks’ role as risk transformers. These 
theories argue that liquidity creation exposes banks to risk (Allen and Santomero, 1998; Allen and 
Gale, 2004) and that higher capital improves the banks’ ability to absorb risk (Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; von Thadden, 2004). Castiglionesi et al. (2014) find that banks can 
use recapitalizations in the presence of higher liquidity risk to reduce risk (risk absorption).  
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) motivates our use of size and regulatory controls. These authors 
find that differences across countries in the size of banks and the types of rules and enforcement 
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allow EU banks to expand their access to safety-net subsidies through cross-border mergers. Our set 
of regulatory and macroeconomic controls (economic freedom, regulatory quality, size of the 
national banking system, geographical location of each bank10, and the level of GDP growth of each 
country) corresponds to the one used in Pasiouras et al. (2011). The market reward control comes 
from Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) who find a relation between banks’ capital position and their 
stock performance, most markedly for larger banks, during the crisis.  
2.2. A sequential model 
To incorporate a dynamic structure, we introduce a sequential multinomial logistic regression 
(Figure 1). In the first stage, banks decide whether they are restructuring in any form or not. Banks 
not restructuring are called non-involved. In the second stage, banks decide whether to be taken over 
or to be recapitalized. In the third stage, banks recapitalize either through private or public 
intervention (depending on the type of investor willing to provide capital to the bank). 
 
*Insert Figure 1* 
2.3. Data set and sample  
We define a takeover as an event involving a change in control, new management, and the end 
of the bank as an independent entity. We define private recapitalizations as the sale of new equity 
shares in the bank to investors according to our calculations of the percentage increase in the number 
                                               
10
 To capture the geographical location of each bank, Pasiouras et al. 2011 use a dummy variable named 5EU (i.e. banks 
operating in one of the five core EU banking sectors, that is France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK), whereas we include a 
dummy variable named EU (i.e. banks operating in the EU-28 countries). To capture the relevance of the cross-border 
activity of EU banks, we do not restrict the analysis to domestic takeovers and recapitalizations only. In our base 
analysis, our sample comprises EU banks considering their cross-border activity, that means private recapitalized banks 
and targets operating in any country of the world providing they are involved in a takeover with a EU bank. This results 
in a sample comprising about 75% EU banks and 25% non-EU banks involved in a takeover with a EU bank. In our 
robustness analysis, our sample comprises EU banks without considering their cross-border activity. This restricted EU 
sample confirms the findings of the base sample taking into account cross-border activities (Table 7, Panel A). 
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of outstanding shares at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. The European Central Bank defines public 
recapitalizations as government purchases of participation capital securities not limited to common 
stocks11 (Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009).  
Given the structure of the sequential model, banks that were acquired and received a capital 
injection in the same year are treated as targets, given that the recapitalization is assumed to be 
driven by the takeover. 
The sample comprises banks as defined in the EU’s Second Banking Directive. We investigate 
(private and public) recapitalizations and takeovers that occurred between January 2002 and 
December 2011. Further, we split this time frame into two subperiods: the pre-crisis from 2002 to 
2006 and  the acute crisis period from 2007 to 2011.12 The focus is on the EU-28 banking industry 
considering also its cross-border activities. Specifically, private recapitalized banks and targets are 
banks operating in any country in the world as long as a EU bank is the acquirer13, whereas public 
recapitalized banks are EU banks.  
The sample comprises 635 private recapitalizations at 1%, 479 at 5%, and 400 at 10%; 33 
public recapitalizations, 50 public guarantees, and 277 deals involving targets for which full 
financial information about the banks is available.14 The sample also comprises banks that have 
                                               
11
 Public recapitalizations also include state interventions not directly linked to equity such as guarantee schemes (e.g. 
guarantees for bank deposits and guarantees for bonds issued by credit institutions).  
12
 For European banks, the acute crisis period comprises both the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and the European 
sovereign debt crisis of 2010-11. The starting date of the global financial crisis is determined according to the Bank for 
International Settlements (2010) as August 2007.  
13
 We consider private recapitalizations for non-EU banks only when the recapitalized bank has also been a target in a 
deal where the acquirer is a EU bank. The rationale for including non-EU private recapitalizations is that we want to 
consider the two possible alternatives (takeover vs. recapitalization) for any bank in the sample. Robustness test on the 
sample are provided, specifically by focusing on a restricted sample comprising EU banks only without any cross-border 
activity (Table 7, Panel A).  
14
 In our sample 16 banks that were taken over also received a private capital injection in the same year, two banks that 
were taken over also received a public capital injection in the same year, and 11 banks that were publicly recapitalized 
were also privately recapitalized in the same year.  
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never engaged in any recapitalization or takeover operation over the life span of this study. The 
sample consists of 4,866 observations over the period under investigation. 
The data are obtained by combining four sources: Thomson One Banker M&A for information 
on takeovers, Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) for information on public recapitalization, Thomson 
Financial Datastream for prices of listed banks and economic indexes, and Bankscope for balance 
sheet and profit and loss data. 
 
3. Empirical results 
We first examine the bank-specific characteristics and regulatory and institutional variables. 
In Panels A and B of Table 2, we report the descriptive statistics for public and private 
recapitalizations and for targets respectively. The values in Table 2 (Panel A) show that 
recapitalized banks are larger than their non-involved counterparts and less capitalized. 
Recapitalized banks tend to operate in countries with more economic freedom and bigger banking 
systems. Further, strong differences affect public and private recapitalizations. Public 
recapitalizations concern banks that are larger, have a lower ROA, have less profitable traditional 
banking, are less cost efficient, are less capitalized, and have grown less over the last year. In terms 
of the regulatory and macroeconomic variables, public recapitalizations take place in countries with 
more economic freedom, less GDP growth, bigger banking systems, and more regulatory quality. 
The values in Table 2 (Panel B) show that the banks involved in takeovers are larger than their non-
involved counterparts, have less profitable traditional banking, are less able to generate free-cash-
flow returns, are less capitalized, and have grown more over the last year. The comparison shows 
that banks involved in takeovers are larger, have less profitable traditional banking, and are less 
capitalized. In terms of regulatory variables, banks involved in takeovers operate in countries with 
less economic freedom than recapitalized banks. 
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Table 3 displays the correlations among all of these independent variables. On average, the 
correlation values are low, and thus provide preliminary evidence that there are low or no 
multicollinearity problems. The tolerance index and variance inflation factor (VIF) confirm that no 
obvious multicollinearity problem affects the variables assumed to be determinants of the likelihood 
of being acquirers and targets except for the regulatory and macroeconomic variables. 
3.1. Multinomial logistic regression 
Key differences arise in the determinants of the likelihood of recapitalizations and takeovers 
for the whole sample period (Table 4, Panel A). Private recapitalizations are more likely for banks 
with less tangible equity, but with higher performance of traditional banking activity, and with 
positive growth at the bank level notwithstanding a negative growth at the country level: that is, 
banks with efficient management that have grown positively over the last year even if the general 
economy performed badly. The most economically significant determinant is tangible equity 
(negative coefficient and marginal effect of about 118%). This finding is the same as in Dinger and 
Vallascas (2015) who find that low capitalized banks are more likely to implement private 
recapitalizations and that market forces primarily motivate the decision to issue rather than capital 
regulation.15 The next most significant determinant is the performance of traditional banking 
(positive coefficient and marginal effect of about 79%). Public recapitalizations are more likely for 
banks that are larger and that operate in larger banking systems, with less liquidity and with positive 
growth at the bank level notwithstanding a negative growth at the country level. Moreover, banks 
that experienced a bad performance in terms of stock returns are more likely to go through public 
recapitalizations (and not instead private recapitalizations or takeovers). The regulatory variables 
become relevant for public recapitalizations, where higher regulatory quality has an association with 
                                               
15
 This finding however is not in line with the corporate finance theory (debt overhang framework) and the banking 
theory (risk-shifting opportunities for shareholders due to the expectation to receive government support when banks are 
unable to repay their debts).  
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a higher likelihood of state intervention. The most economically significant determinants for public 
recapitalizations are stock returns (negative coefficient and marginal effect of about 20%) and 
liquidity (negative coefficient and marginal effect of about 13%). These coefficients indicate that 
governments seek stabilization through recapitalization. Within recapitalizations, state interventions 
occur in more difficult times, where there is the need to avoid bank runs and private interventions 
are not possible. Takeovers are more likely when banks’ distress concerns the profitability of the 
traditional banking activity and when banks operate outside the EU. The most economically 
significant determinant is the performance of traditional banking (negative coefficient and marginal 
effect of 77%). Takeovers take place when the acquiring bank perceives the possibility to improve 
the performance of the target in its traditional banking activity. Our results show that bank takeovers 
are more likely than private recapitalizations for banks when their distress concerns the performance 
of traditional banking activities. 
The performance of traditional banking discriminates takeovers and private recapitalizations: 
there is a market for corporate control when the performance from the traditional banking activity is 
low, whereas private recapitalizations occur in a search for stability when the performance on the 
traditional banking activity is higher. This suggests that the main motivation for takeovers is to 
improve one specific dimension of the operating performance (that is the profitability of the 
traditional banking activity, that according to the banking literature reflects the exercise of market 
power and/or its effect on operational efficiency), whereas for private recapitalizations it is to reduce 
bank risk taking (risk taking hypotheses as for solvency risk) in presence of better operating 
performance, and for public recapitalizations it is to create liquidity (risk taking hypotheses as for 
liquidity risk) in presence of larger size and bad market performance. 
Our results show that bank takeovers are more likely than private recapitalizations for banks 
when their distress concerns their performance of their traditional banking activity, that might 
suggest inefficient management on the lending and borrowing side (notwithstanding a variety of 
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other factors such as higher competition, lower risk -taking or lower levels of inflation. In such a 
context, takeovers have several advantages over private recapitalizations (as supported by our results 
and anecdotic evidence). First, banks can acquire less profitable ones in order to create value in the 
traditional banking activity by exporting their superior managerial skills (i.e. expectation of an 
improvement in the core banking activity). Assuming that the net interest margin reflects the 
exercise of market power and/or its effect on operational efficiency (Berger et al. 2004), poorly 
managed banks exhibit relatively poor performance of traditional banking activity and takeovers 
serve to drive out bad management. Second, equity investors in a bank must constantly worry that 
bad decisions by management will dissipate the value of their shareholdings, and this is especially 
important in the case of a bank poorly managed in the past (Kashyap et al. 2008). Third, in contrast 
with the debt overhang theory prediction, banks are willing to issue new equity even when capital is 
low; this evidence however is not dissimilar to the one in Dinger and Vallascas (2015).  
When we focus on recapitalizations, the evidence shows that a higher likelihood of going 
through a public recapitalization is associated with banks with lower liquidity and larger size as well 
as low growth at the country level, whereas capitalization and operating performance are not 
relevant. Lower liquidity, and not lower tangible equity, drives public interventions. The evidence 
on liquidity and size for public recapitalizations is consistent with Mariathasan and Merrouche 
(2012) who find that the probability of a bank being recapitalized decreases with the bank’s liquidity 
and increases with the bank’s size. The evidence on equity for public recapitalization instead differs 
from Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) who find that the probability of a bank being recapitalized 
decreases with the bank’s Tier 1 capital. However, for the US government equity infusions, 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2013) show that strong US banks opted out of participating in the 
Capital Purchase Program of the TARP and that the US provided equity infusions to banks that 
posed systemic risk and faced high financial distress costs but had strong asset quality.  
  
 
 
17
Our results show that public recapitalizations are more likely than other forms of 
restructurings in case of emergency (i.e. where large banks because of liquidity problems are 
potentially subject to bank runs). For banks potentially subject to bank runs, especially in the crisis 
period, the time required to solve bank distress is a primary issue and public recapitalizations are 
quicker, whereas private interventions tend to be sluggish (higher coordination costs and higher 
information asymmetry of small shareholders). Not only is capital a relatively costly mode of 
funding at all times, it is particularly costly for a bank to raise new capital during times of great 
uncertainty (Kashyap et al. 2008). Moreover public recapitalizations are less likely to involve 
information leakages to depositors and thus less likely to lead to bank runs. This explains why 
recapitalizations during the 2007-08 crisis have been driven by government intervention aimed at 
restructuring in order to avoid contagion (UK House of Commons Treasury Committee 2009).  
Our evidence on public recapitalizations in Europe would appear to support the view to 
impose liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios (to address the issue of maturity mismatch in 
the short and medium term, with the aim to reduce the probability and cost of public 
recapitalizations). Our evidence on private (but not public) recapitalizations would appear to support 
the view of the Basel III Committee that macro-prudential regulation must require banks to hold 
higher levels of capital (given that private recapitalizations are driven by the presence of lower 
capital). A strong normative implication however cannot be derived in the absence of a welfare 
analysis weighing the costs of the higher levels of capital and liquidity. Moreover, banks that 
experienced a bad performance in terms of stock returns are more likely to go through public 
recapitalizations (instead of private recapitalizations and takeovers): this is consistent with bank 
managers having the desire to avoid both private capital increases and takeovers when the market 
performance would damage the negotiation power of the bank. Finally we find that public (but not 
private) recapitalizations are more likely for larger banks, this means that the larger the size the 
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higher the likelihood of a state bailout. This is clearly in line with the current discussion on the 
regulation of too big to fail. 
Panels B and C of Table 4 show the pre-crisis (2002-2006) and the crisis (2007-2011) 
periods. The evidence on the pre-crisis period shows that the same factors affect the likelihood of 
becoming a target or of being recapitalized: essentially lower liquidity and lower tangible equity, 
although the adverse effect of liquidity tends to be mitigated in the presence of higher tangible 
equity. The evidence on the likelihood of becoming targets is consistent with Beccalli and Frantz 
(2013): banks with lower liquidity might be acquired because they have liquidity problems that are 
difficult to resolve, and banks with lower capitalization are more likely targets because acquirers 
prefer lower capitalization because they can generate larger gains by improving the efficiency of the 
target and because they can pay less for the deal. Instead, during the crisis, a key difference in the 
determinants for targets and recapitalizations emerges: private recapitalizations are more likely when 
banks have lower tangible equity, higher performance in their traditional banking, and positive 
growth. Public recapitalizations are more likely when banks have lower liquidity and larger size, 
whereas takeovers are more likely when banks have lower performance in their traditional banking. 
Moreover, we find a higher likelihood of being involved in recapitalizations for banks operating in 
bigger banking systems and with negative growth at the country level. Conversely, we find a higher 
likelihood of being involved in takeovers for targets operating in countries with more economic 
freedom and less regulatory quality. 
The key difference in the determinants for targets and recapitalizations during the crisis, as 
opposed to their similarity before the crisis, might be explained by the sharp increase in systemic 
risk that induced governments to intervene by encouraging acquirers to take over weaker banks. 
Moreover, the higher concerns among private investors on bank failures, and their lower confidence 
in the banking system, made them less prone to provide equity in the form of recapitalizations
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during the crisis (Okonkwo Osili and Paulson, 2009). Therefore, these concerns led to takeovers or 
public interventions rather than private recapitalizations especially in cases of larger distress. 
3.2. A sequential logistic regression 
The first stage of the sequential logistic regression (Table 5, Panel A) highlights key 
differences in the determinants of being involved in any form of restructuring as opposed to not 
being involved. In particular, banks decide on restructuring when their equity is lower, their liquidity 
is lower, their growth is higher, they operate in bigger banking systems, and when they operate 
outside the EU in countries experiencing lower growth. The second stage of the sequential logistic 
regression confirms the key differences in the determinants of takeovers or recapitalizations as 
observed in the static model. In particular, banks recapitalize when their performance in traditional 
banking (net interest margin) is stronger and growth at the country level is lower. We observe that 
equity is not statistically significant due to the fact that targets are compared with both private and 
public recapitalizations, and equity does not matter in public recapitalizations. The third stage of the 
sequential logistic regression confirms most of the key differences in the determinants of being 
privately versus publicly recapitalized as observed in the static model. In particular, banks use 
private recapitalizations when their liquidity is higher, when they are smaller, when they operate in 
smaller banking systems, and when they operate in countries experiencing higher growth and lower 
regulatory quality. In addition to the results of the static model, we find that banks with higher cost 
efficiency (lower cost-to-income ratio) are more likely to go for private recapitalizations. Thus state 
intervention is more likely for large banks with low cost efficiency that operate in countries with low 
growth but high regulatory quality. Further, private recapitalizations are not necessarily more likely 
when banks have lower tangible equity. This finding indicates that in a dynamic model, the decision 
to recapitalize is not driven by a low level of equity but instead is driven by the operating 
performance and liquidity hypotheses. However, in the first stage of the dynamic model, the 
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presence of a lower level of equity is a determinant of any form of restructuring (both 
recapitalizations and takeovers. 
When restricting our sample to the crisis period (Table 5, Panel B), the first stage of the 
sequential logistic regression shows that banks decide to go for a form of restructuring when their 
equity is lower, their liquidity is lower, their growth is higher, they operate in bigger banking 
systems, and when they operate outside the EU in countries experiencing lower growth and higher 
economic freedom. Similar to the overall period, the second stage of the logistic sequential 
regression confirms most of the key differences in the determinants of takeovers versus 
recapitalizations as observed in the static model. In particular, the likelihood of being acquired is 
higher when banks have lower performing traditional banking activities and operate in countries 
with higher economic freedom, lower regulatory quality, and higher growth. In the third stage, the 
likelihood of a public recapitalization is higher for larger banks with higher cost efficiency and 
lower liquidity that operate in bigger banking systems located in countries with lower growth but 
higher regulatory quality. Again, tangible equity does not appear to be a determinant of 
recapitalizations in the second and third stages of the dynamic model but is a determinant of 
restructurings in the first stage. This finding indicates that the decision to recapitalize does not occur 
as a consequence of equity deficiency in itself but instead occurs as a consequence of an interaction 
between cost inefficiency, liquidity issues, and low growth at the country level for banks with a 
lower level of equity in comparison to banks non-involved in any form of restructuring. 
  
4. Robustness tests 
4.1. Methodology 
As a robustness test with respect to methodological issues, we add bootstrapped non-
parametric tests to the multinomial logistic regression and use a different regression methodology.  
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The bootstrapping randomly reassigns a treatment to avoid assuming asymptotic normality.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows that our results confirm the findings in the baseline model. Using 95% 
confidence intervals, banks are more likely to become targets when their performance of traditional 
banking activity is lower, and they are located outside the EU. Similarly, using 95% confidence 
intervals, banks are more likely to be privately recapitalized when their performance in traditional 
banking is higher, tangible equity is lower, growth is positive, and when they are located outside the 
EU. Further, using 95% confidence intervals, banks are more likely to be publicly recapitalized 
when they are larger, operate in larger banking systems with higher regulatory quality, their liquidity 
is lower, and when there is positive growth at the bank level notwithstanding negative growth at the 
country level.  
The Cox regression methodology is a subclass of the survival models used to investigate the 
likelihood of banks becoming targets or recapitalized and when comparing the nature of the 
determinants. Survival models derive the hazard of an event as a function of a vector of independent 
variables X and parameters . The response variable, survival time, is the time till the event occurs. 
Survival models explicitly control for each firm’s period at risk. Cox regressions are proportional 
hazard models. In a Cox regression with time-dependent covariates, the vector of independent 
variables X depends explicitly on time. Furthermore, the hazard rate h(t) is the likelihood of an event 
taking place at date t given that the event did not take place previously. The rate takes the following 
functional form:  
eh tth $"# !% "! "! "! ")()( 0=             (2) 
where h0(t) denotes the baseline hazard, that is, the hazard obtained when X(t) = 0. Both h0(t) and  
are estimated by the regression. We use Cox regressions with time-varying covariates estimated 
using the partial likelihood method, as in Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Hannan and Pilloff (2009), 
and Goddard et al. (2009). No functional form is imposed on the baseline hazard but the covariates 
enter the model linearly, so the estimation has semi-parametric features. In modelling the time-to-
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takeover and time-to-recapitalization, banks are censored in the year in which they are acquired or 
recapitalized. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that an increase in the relevant variable 
leads to an increase (decrease) in the event hazard, regardless of whether it is a target or a 
recapitalization hazard. 
The results from the Cox regressions extensively support those generated by the multinomial 
logistic regression and appear robust to the variant tested (Table 6). First, in line with the logistic 
regression, the likelihood of becoming a target decreases with the net interest margin. In the Cox 
regression, we also find that the likelihood of becoming a target decreases with the bank’s size and 
the country’s regulatory quality, and increases with the country’s economic freedom. Moreover, in 
line with the logistic regression, the likelihood of being privately recapitalized increases with the 
performance in traditional banking and with the bank’s growth (notwithstanding a negative 
country’s growth), whereas it decreases with tangible equity and with the location of the bank in the 
EU. Further, in line with the logistic regression, the likelihood of being publicly recapitalized 
increases with the bank’s growth (notwithstanding a negative country’s growth), the bank’s size, and 
the banking system’s size; whereas it decreases with performance in terms of stock returns.  
 
4.2. Sample and category specification 
To test the robustness of our results to the sample specification, we also estimate the 
likelihood of becoming a target or being recapitalized (as in Table 4) for the EU banking industry 
without considering any cross-border activity (i.e. restricted sample to domestic activities only with 
standard errors clustered at country level); more specifically, private and public recapitalized banks 
as well as targets are EU banks (Table 7, Panel A). The previous results including cross-border 
activities are confirmed here for the full period and the crisis period: private recapitalizations are 
more likely for banks with less tangible equity but with positive growth and higher cost efficiency, 
whereas public recapitalizations are more likely for larger banks with less liquidity but with positive 
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growth (notwithstanding a negative country’s growth). Banks are more likely to become targets 
when their distress concerns traditional banking activities (lower net interest margin). 
To test the robustness of our results to the category specification, we control for the nature of 
a private recapitalization. When motivated by a takeover, we now classify the private 
recapitalization as a private recapitalization associated with a takeover (Table 7, Panel B).16 The 
results for the likelihood of being recapitalized versus acquired are confirmed: the main motivation 
for takeovers is to improve the performance in traditional lending and borrowing activities, whereas 
the motivation for private recapitalizations is to reduce risk taking in the presence of higher 
performance in traditional banking (higher net interest margin) and higher growth. However, the 
private recapitalizations associated with takeovers show different determinants: positive 
performance and growth do not matter, whereas positive performance and growth increase the 
likelihood of being privately recapitalized. Instead lower liquidity and better credit risk increase the 
likelihood of private recapitalizations associated with takeovers. 
4.3. Predictive accuracy of logistic regressions 
The multinomial logistic regression estimates the probability of a bank becoming involved in 
takeovers as a target as well as the probability of it being recapitalized. With respect to each 
potential event, each observation is assigned to one of two portfolios: observations with probabilities 
higher than the median probability generated by the multinomial logistic regression are assigned to 
the higher probability portfolio (HPP), whilst observations with probabilities lower than the median 
probability are assigned to the lower probability portfolio (LPP). The median probabilities are 7% 
for becoming a target, 19.1% for being recapitalized, and 0.12% for being publicly recapitalized. 
Table 8 provides the number of banks in each portfolio that actually become targets or are 
                                               
16
 There are 16 cases of private recapitalizations associated with takeovers, whereas there is only one case of a public 
recapitalization associated with a takeover that is also associated with a private recapitalization. Therefore, we do not 
create a category for public recapitalizations associated with takeovers. 
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recapitalized, whether privately or publicly. If the multinomial logistic regression is useful in 
identifying the banks undergoing the above-described events, the higher probability portfolio should 
contain a higher number of event banks than the low probability portfolio. As shown in Table 8 
(Panel A), the model works particularly well for targets and public recapitalizations, with the higher 
probability portfolio containing more than twice as many targets and all of the banks being publicly 
recapitalized. The null hypothesis that the multinomial logistic regression is not useful in predicting 
events is rejected at the 1% level. 
As a further robustness test, the multinomial regression is estimated in a crisis subperiod 
consisting of the years 2007, 2009, and 2011 and validated in another crisis subperiod consisting of 
the years 2008 and 2010. In the estimation subperiod, all banks are allocated to three different 
portfolios based on the output of the logistic regression.  The thirtile of observations with the highest 
estimated probability of an event taking place is allocated to the HPP portfolio, the second thirtile to 
the MPP portfolio, and the last thirtile to the LPP portfolio.  Panel B of Table 8 shows that the 
number of banks being taken over or being recapitalized increases from the LPP portfolio to the 
HPP portfolio, although not monotonically. The estimated regression coefficients are then used to 
generate predictions in the validation subsample.  Table 8 (Panel B) shows that the number of banks 
being taken over or recapitalized still increases in the validation subsample from the LPP portfolio 
to the HPP portfolio, although not monotonically. Overall the model works well in the validation 
subsample (i.e. the null hypothesis that the multinomial logistic regression is not useful in predicting 
events is rejected at the 1% level). Further, all public recapitalizations, except for one, are in the 
HPP portfolio, and the vast majority of the variables that are significant in the multinomial 
regression on the overall sample are also statistically significant and with the same signs when the 
multinomial regression is estimated in the estimation sample.   
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5. Conclusion 
This study uses both static and sequential multinomial regressions in order to identify the 
determinants of a bank being involved in a takeover as well as being (privately or publicly) 
recapitalized over the period from 2002 to 2011. Moreover, we compare the determinants between 
both the pre-crisis (2002-2006) and the crisis period (2007-2011). 
The main results are as follows: Takeovers are more likely when the distress concerns 
traditional banking activity (lower net interest margin), whilst private recapitalizations are more 
likely for banks with lower equity, higher performing traditional banking activities, positive growth 
at the bank level, and are located in countries with lower growth.  Public recapitalizations instead are 
more likely for larger and less liquid banks with positive growth that operate in bigger banking 
systems that are located in countries with lower growth. This finding shows that banks can pursue 
private recapitalizations when their performance in traditional banking is stronger, whilst state 
intervention occurs as a consequence of an interaction among cost inefficiency, liquidity issues, and 
lower growth at the country level. In short, there is a need for corporate control when the 
performance in the traditional banking activity is lower (i.e. takeovers occur when acquirers can 
improve the market power and/or its effect on the operational efficiency of the target’s traditional 
banking activities), whereas the search for stability explains recapitalizations (and within 
recapitalizations, a state intervention occurs in more difficult situations of emergency, where a 
private intervention is not possible).  
The determinants differ widely between the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. Whilst in the 
pre-crisis period few differences between the determinants of being taken over and recapitalized 
arise, major differences emerge in the crisis. The major difference is that the likelihood of being 
taken over is adversely affected by the bank’s net interest margin, whereas the likelihood of being 
privately recapitalized is adversely affected by the magnitude of the tangible equity and is positively 
affected by growth. This finding shows that the main motivation for takeovers is to improve one 
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specific dimension of operating performance, whereas the main motivation for private 
recapitalizations is to reduce solvency risk in the presence of better operating performance. Further, 
the likelihood of a bank being subject to public recapitalization is adversely affected by the bank’s 
liquidity and GDP growth, and is positively affected by growth in the past year and the bank’s size. 
Our evidence provides a tool for prudential supervision by identifying characteristics that 
enable supervisory authorities to forecast the most likely outcome (takeover vs. recapitalization), 
and the national governments/supervisory authorities to engineer recapitalizations in the case of state 
bailouts. In the absence of the costs of the higher levels of capital and liquidity, it also supports the 
view of the Basel III Committee that prudential regulation should require banks to hold higher levels 
of capital and should impose the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio. Finally, by 
documenting that the larger the bank’s size in relation to liquidity, the higher the likelihood of a state 
bailout, our evidence contributes to the current discussion on too big to fail. 
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Figure 1: A sequential model 
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Table 1 Takeover and recapitalization likelihood hypotheses and independent variables 
Hypothesis Variable Variable 
name 
Variable proxy Expected 
sign targets 
Expected 
sign recap 
Hp 1. Operating 
performance 
Operating 
profitability 
ROA Net income /Total assets - + 
hypothesis Net interest margin NIM [Interest Income - Interest 
Expense]/Loans 
- + 
 Free-cash-flow return FCFR Free-Cash-Flow Return = [Operating 
income - (Earning assets – Earning 
assetsLV1) + (Deposits - DepositsLV1)] 
/ Operating income 
- + 
 Cost-to-income CTI Operating costs/Intermediation 
margin 
- + 
 Growth GROWTH [Total assets – Total assetsLV1]/ Total 
assetsLV1 
- + 
Hp 2. Risk taking  Capital strength Equity Tangible equity / Total assets +/- - 
hypothesis  Credit risk NCO Net charge off/Total assets +/- + 
 Liquidity risk LIQ Liquid assets / Total assets - - 
Control variables Size  LNTA Ln (Total assets) +/- +/- 
 Market price change PRICE_CH 
 
Change in the market price (return) 
over the last 12 months 
 + 
 Economic freedom EC_FREE Includes business freedom, trade 
freedom, monetary freedom, freedom 
from government, fiscal freedom, 
property rights, investment freedom, 
financial freedom, freedom from 
corruption and labour freedom
[Heritage Foundation] 
+/- +/- 
 Regulatory quality REG_Q Ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector 
development [World Bank] 
+/- +/- 
 Banking industry size CLAIMS Bank claims on the private sector / 
GDP [Euromonitor international] 
+/- + 
 EU bank EU Dummy equal one for banks located 
in EU-28 countries 
  
 GDP growth GDPG Growth in the GDP of the country 
where the bank is listed 
+/- + 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for bank-specific and regulatory and institutional variables 
Panel A 
 
 
ROA NIM FCFR CTI Growth Tangible
Eq 
NCO Liquid  Price Economic 
Freedom 
GDP 
Growth 
Bank 
Claims 
Reg. 
Quality 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
r
e
c
a
p

N 33 33 33 33 33 33 28 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Mean 0.01 0.03 -1.02 0.66 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.21 18.74 0.03 69.83 -2.39 138.42 1.36 
Median 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.63 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.15 19.45 0.00 70.50 -2.70 111.30 1.39 
Dv.std 0.01 0.01 4.57 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.17 1.79 0.68 7.80 2.46 54.82 0.38 
Min -0.03 0.01 -11.57 0.46 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 0.01 14.83 -0.81 61.00 -7.00 69.80 1.00 
Max 0.03 0.07 9.13 1.32 0.89 0.09 0.01 0.62 20.17 2.28 82.00 1.80 234.50 2.00 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
r
e
c
a
p

N 495 487 431 494 424 440 268 494 496 635 629 635 635 635 
Mean 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.62 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.20 16.18 0.05 67.13 1.97 111.80 1.08 
Median 0.01 0.04 0.67 0.59 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.17 16.10 0.00 67.20 2.30 104.50 1.22 
Dv.std 0.01 0.06 4.07 0.21 0.25 0.06 0.1 0.15 2.28 0.42 8.54 3.85 62.68 0.66 
Min -0.03 0.01 -14.52 0.23 -0.24 0.02 -0.02 0.01 11.02 -0.95 46.00 -17.70 0.00 -1.00 
Max 0.05 0.34 9.13 1.32 0.89 0.35 0.13 0.07 20.17 2.98 90.00 13.10 397.80 2.00 
N
o
 
r
e
c
a
p
 
N 517 509 453 516 446 462 285 516 518 657 651 657 657 657 
Mean 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.622 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.20 16.29 0.05 67.23 1.83 112.71 1.09 
Median 0.01 0.04 0.66 0.59 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.16 16.20 0.00 67.20 2.20 105.00 1.22 
Dv.std 0.01 0.06 4.08 0.21 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.15 2.32 0.43 8.52 3.89 62.56 0.65 
Min -0.03 0.01 -14.52 0.23 -0.24 0.02 -0.01 0.01 11.02 -0.95 46.00 -17.70 0.00 -1.00 
Max 0.05 0.34 9.13 1.32 0.89 0.35 0.03 0.78 20.17 2.98 90.00 13.10 397.80 2.00 
Public vs Private  Difference -0.01 -0.03 -1.16 0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 2.60 -0.04 3.64 -4.38 27.18 0.32t-test -2.43** -6.65*** -1.25 1.84* -2.92*** -8.55*** -0.80 0.46 6.51*** -0.28 2.18** -7.37*** 2.32** 3.95***
Recap vs No recap Difference 0.00 -0.01 -0.18 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.34 0.03 1.89 -0.24 8.07 0.01
t-test -0.01 -0.66 -0.85 -0.72 2.23 -3.59*** -0.45 -1.37 3.05*** 1.46 3.99*** -1.49 3.10*** 018
Panel B 
 
 
ROA NIM FCFR CTI Growth Tangible 
Eq 
NCO Liquid  Price Economic 
Freedom 
GDP 
Growth 
Bank 
Claims 
Reg. 
Quality 
T
a
r
g
e
t
s

N 201 199 188 201 175 171 108 201 201 276 258 278 276 277 
Mean 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.62 0.19 0.08 0.01 0.21 16.06 0.01 65.88 2.43 96.91 0.86 
Median 0.01 0.03 0.5 0.62 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.19 15.88 0.00 64.30 2.15 91.65 0.98 
Dv.std 0.01 0.05 3.99 0.19 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.15 2.36 0.41 8.86 3.37 63.59 0.75 
Min 0.03 0.01 14.52 0.23 -0.24 0.02 0.02 0.01 11.02 -0.90 41.00 -14.80 0.00 -1.00 
Max 0.05 0.34 9.13 1.31 0.89 0.35 0.03 0.76 20.17 4.26 90.00 14.20 400.90 2.00 
N
o
n
-
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
N 2381 2339 2102 2377 1994 2015 1181 2380 2389 4208 4076 4216 4198 4208 
Mean 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.62 0.15 0.09 0.01 0.21 15.77 0.02 67.22 2.03 104.99 1.08 
Median 0.01 0.04 0.67 0.60 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.18 15.76 0.00 67.20 2.10 104.10 1.22 
Dv.std 0.02 0.06 3.78 0.21 0.25 0.07 0.01 0.15 2.17 0.28 8.14 3.38 58.82 0.65 
Min 0.03 0.01 14.52 0.23 -0.24 0.02 0.02 0.01 11.02 -0.97 37.00 -17.70 0.00 -1.00 
Max 0.05 0.34 9.13 1.32 0.89 0.35 0.03 0.78 20.17 3.78 90.00 14.20 484.50 2.00 
Takeover vs Non-
involved 
Difference -0.01 -0.01 -0.55 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 1.45 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 5.40 0.01
t-test -1.36 -4.83*** -2.60*** -1.37 1.71* -8.83*** -0.80 -0.13 12.30*** -0.76 -0.11 0.03 2.12** 0.06
Takeover vs Recap Difference 0.00 -0.01 -0.41 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.96 -0.02 -1.42 0.26 -1.53 0.01
t-test -0.21 -2.38** -1.467 -0.51 -0.46 -2.78*** -0.03 0.61 6.26*** -1.06 -2.08** 1.33 -0.44 0.31
Differences in means (and their t-tests) are reported. Variables (as defined in Table 1) refer to the year prior to the deal. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significant of t-tests at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
  
 
 
34
Table 3 Correlation analysis 
Spearman 
Pearson lnTA LIQ ROA NIM FCFR CTI NCO Equity Price_ch Growth PublicRec EU 
Liq_Equit
y 
EC_FRE
E GDPG Claims REQ_Q 
lnTA 
 
1 
 
-0.11*** -0.16*** -0.44*** -0.13*** -0.2*** 0.08*** -0.62*** -0.07*** -0.15*** 0.12*** 0.2*** -0.45*** 0.32*** -0.21*** 0.34*** 0.30***
LIQ 
 
-0.13*** 1 0.04** 0.35*** 0.03 0.28*** -0.10*** -0.04** 0.03* 0.15*** -0.012 -0.06*** 0.75*** -0.17*** 0.17*** -0.17*** -0.14***
ROA 
 
-0.10*** 0.040** 1 0.37*** -0.08*** -0.39*** -0.05** 0.46*** 0.05** 0.303* -0.053 -0.078 0.31*** -0.09*** 0.20*** -0.20*** -0.08***
NIM 
 
-0.322*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 1 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.49*** 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.09*** -0.18*** 0.56*** -0.33*** 0.17*** -0.41*** -0.36***
FCFR 
 
-0.123*** 0.024 -0.014 0.064 1 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.05*** -0.38*** -0.019 -0.022 0.07*** -0.10*** -0.021 -0.06*** -0.15***
CTI 
 
-0.198*** 0.23*** -0.42*** -0.003 0.07*** 1 -0.031 -0.08*** 0.018 -0.07*** 0.014 0.037** 0.20*** -0.08*** -0.02 -0.10*** -0.05***
NCO 
 
0.039 -0.063** -0.13*** 0.13*** 0.032 -0.004 1 -0.06** 0.02 -0.06** -0.003 -0.03 -0.13*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.002 0.10***
Equity 
 
-0.555*** 0.06*** 0.32*** 0.47*** 0.06*** 0.012 -0.09*** 1 0.016 0.05** -0.13*** -0.21*** 0.57*** -0.32*** 0.11*** -0.34*** -0.35***
Price_ch 
 
-0.085*** 0.045** 0.002 0.06*** 0.039* 0.015 0.011 0.009 1 -0.06*** -0.012 -0.015 0.033 -0.009 0.09*** -0.07*** 0.03**
Growth 
 
-0.196*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 0.037* -0.26*** -0.08*** -0.076* 0.041* -0.04** 1 -0.006 -0.08*** 0.15*** -0.12*** 0.24*** -0.17*** -0.11***
Public.Recap 
 
0.131*** -0.003 -0.034* -0.05*** -0.033* 0.019 -0.013 -0.09*** 0.002 -0.015 1 0.04*** -0.09*** 0.028** -0.11*** 0.05*** 0.03**
EU 
 
0.208*** -0.05*** -0.029 -0.08*** -0.034* 0.024 -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.049*** -0.09*** 0.043*** 1 -0.17*** 0.17*** -0.25*** 0.38*** 0.32***
Liq_Equity 
 
-0.44*** 0.61*** 0.16*** 0.43*** 0.07*** 0.17*** -0.12** 0.65*** 0.031 0.11*** -0.05*** -0.09*** 1 -0.30*** 0.21*** -0.31*** -0.30***
EC_FREE 
 
0.33*** -0.19*** -0.06*** -0.17*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 0.08*** -0.27*** -0.016 -0.18*** 0.028* 0.29*** -0.24*** 1 -0.16*** 0.68*** 0.88***
GDPG 
 
-0.19*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.06*** -0.02 -0.05*** 0.064** 0.045** 0.048*** 0.28*** -0.11*** -0.24*** 0.07*** -0.14*** 1 -0.35*** -0.20***
Claims 
 
0.33*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.07*** -0.11*** 0.00 -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.18*** 0.046*** 0.31*** -0.15*** 0.57*** -0.325 *** 1 0.72***
REG_Q 
 
0.37*** -0.13*** -0.03 -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.04** 0.08*** -0.234*** -0.41*** -0.18*** 0.035** 0.48*** -0.18*** 0.75*** -0.266*** 0.645*** 1
Tolerance 0.415 0.230 0.571 0.509 0.839 0.636 0.883 0.188 0.958 0.696 0.944 0.731 0.137 0.383 0.786 0.511 0.311 
VIF 2.409 4.346 1.752 1.964 1.192 1.572 1.132 5.625 1.044 1.437 1.059 1.369 6.721 2.608 1.273 1.958 3.217 
Variables (as defined in Table 1) refer to the year prior to the deal. The *** and **  represent significance of the Spearman and Pearson correlations at the 1% and 5% (2-tailed) levels respectively. Variance inflation factor 
(VIF) and tolerance index are used to detect muticollinearity. The diagonal elements of the inverse of the correlation matrix are called VIF. A VIF>10 indicates harmful collinearity. The tolerance index is the reciprocal of the 
VIF. 
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Table 4 Determinants of takeovers, private and public recapitalizations (full period, pre-crisis and crisis); multinomial logistic  
Hp Variables (lagged 
values by 1 year) 
Panel A. Full period all sample  Panel B. Pre-crisis 
all sample 
Panel C. Crisis 
all sample 
  Target       Private recap          Public recap Target Private recap Target Private recap Public recap 
 
 
Coeff Marginal 
effect 
Coeff Marginal 
effect 
Coeff Marginal 
effect 
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coef 
H
p
 
1
 
ROA 5.351 
(0.168) 
0.266 4.095 
(0.230) 
0.493 4.933 
(0.029) 
0.086 -0.862 
(0.001) 
8.524 
(0.212) 
-1.335 
(0.008) 
3.937 
(0.194) 
3.075 
(0.012) 
NIM -11.709* 
(2.924) 
-0.770 4.709** 
(4.666) 
0.795 2.432 
(0.023) 
0.056 3.786 
(0.624) 
1.224 
(0.160) 
-18.576** 
(4.752) 
3.145* 
(2.716) 
1.809 
(0.012) 
FCFR 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 -0.006 
(0.073) 
-0.001 0.052 
(1.664) 
0.001 -0.060 
(1.188) 
-0.021 
(0.194) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.063) 
0.053 
(1.769) 
CTI -0.066 
(0.001) 
0.002 -0.312 
(0.360) 
-0.049 1.087 
(1.020) 
0.027 -0.069 
(0.003) 
-0.033 
(0.001) 
-0.150 
(0.032) 
-0.371 
(0.436) 
0.997 
(0.884) 
GROWTH 0.174 
(0.073) 
0.004 0.776** 
(3.725) 
0.094 2.809** 
(6.101) 
0.062 -0.174 
(0.032) 
0.464 
(0.410) 
0.695 
(1.020) 
0.834** 
(3.386) 
2.856** 
(6.250) 
H
p
 
2
 
 
EQUITY -1.688 
(0.090) 
0.007 -8.569** 
(4.666) 
-1.176 -4.037 
(0.040) 
-0.049 -20.052* 
(3.349) 
-12.998** 
(4.537) 
-0.280 
(0.002) 
-7.652* 
(3.063) 
-5.591 
(0.073) 
NCO -9.535 
(0.260) 
-0.474 -7.596 
(0.410) 
-0.929 -7.131 
(0.020) 
-0.112 - - -1.726 
(0.001) 
-2.360 
(0.032) 
4.349 
(0.006) 
LIQ -2.123 
(1.392) 
-0.102 -1.326 
(1.440) 
-0.134 -5.814* 
(3.422) 
-0126 -4.425* 
(3.098) 
-5.371*** 
(6.812) 
-3.455 
(2.250) 
-0.486 
(0.160) 
-5.800* 
(3.168) 
LIQ*EQ 11.054 
(0.281) 
0.535 11.836 
(0.774) 
1.564 -3.095 
(0.002) 
-0.153 58.679** 
(5.476) 
50.163*** 
(8.644) 
8.469 
(0.123) 
0.577 
(0.002) 
-2.713 
(0.002) 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
LnTA -0.020  
(0.058) 
0.003 -0.054 
 (0.960) 
-0.013 1.209*** 
(19.625) 
0.029 -0.161 
(1.513) 
-0.050 
(0.292) 
-0.055 
(0.336) 
-0.053 
(0.757) 
1.189*** 
(19.360) 
PRICE_CH -0.171 
(0.230) 
-0.008 -0.079 
(0.123) 
-0.005 -0.911* 
(2.993) 
-0.201 0.605 
(0.846) 
0.707 
(2.496) 
-0.120 
(0.240) 
-0.165 
(0.490) 
-0.817 
(2.435) 
EC_FREE 0.055 
(2.190) 
0.006 -0.009 
(0.123) 
-0.002 -0.053 
(0.360) 
0.011 -0.090 
(2.250) 
0.011 
(0.053) 
0.096** 
(5.198) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.036 
(0.168) 
REG_Q -0.718 
(1.850) 
-0.051 0.178 
(0.240) 
0.020 2.823* 
(3.572) 
0.067 0.839 
(0.922) 
0.114 
(0.023) 
-1.448** 
(5.244) 
-0.079 
(0.001) 
2.512* 
(2.856) 
CLAIMS 0.003 
(1.323) 
0.001 0.002 
(1.796) 
0.001 0.012*** 
(6.760) 
0.001 -0.008 
(1.440) 
0.001 
(0.109) 
0.004 
(2.372) 
0.003* 
(2.822) 
0.011** 
(5.617) 
GDPG 0.020 
(0.384) 
0.002 -0.042** 
(4.410) 
-0.004 -0.337*** 
(21.809) 
-0.008 -0.158 
(1.716) 
-0.022 
(0.058) 
0.036 
(0.980) 
-0.042** 
(3.960) 
-0.314*** 
(18.490) 
EU -0.655** 
(3.842) 
-0.311 -0.587** 
(6.401) 
-0.071 -0.870 
(1.613) 
-0.016 -0.826 
(1.932) 
0.394 
(0.689) 
-0.567 
(2.372) 
-0.670*** 
(6.970) 
-0.895 
(1.69) 
 Intercept -4.109 
(2.250) 
 0.710 
(0.152) 
 -26.839*** 
(14.823) 
 3.352 
(0.706) 
-1.076 
(0.109) 
-5.371* 
(2.924) 
0.304 
(0.023) 
-26.810*** 
(14.669) 
 N. targets 83 39 67 
 N. private recap 209 74 177 
N. public recap 41 - 41 
N. non-involved 883 389 726 
Chi-square 203.55*** 37.21* 201.93*** 
Nagelkerke R2 0.108 0.0073 0.1224 
Variables (as defined in Table 1) refer to the year prior to the deal. The marginal effect shows the partial change in the likelihood with respect to the variation in each independent variable, evaluated at the sample mean value 
of each variable. The N is the number of observations. Wald tests are in parentheses. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significance of the Wald tests at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The chi-square is a goodness of fit 
test that indicates how well the logistic regression model fits the data. The Nagelkerke's R2 is a pseudo-R2 that indicates the power of explanation of the multinomial logistic model (Nagelkerke, 1991). 
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Table 5 Determinants of takeovers, private and public recapitalizations (full period, pre-crisis, and 
crisis) from a sequential logistic regression 
Hp Variables (lagged values by 
1 year) 
Panel A. Full period Panel B. Crisis 
 First stage 
Recap and 
Targets vs. 
Non-involved 
Second stage 
Private and 
public recap 
vs. Targets 
Third  Stage 
Public vs. 
private recap 
 
First stage 
Recap ns and 
Targets vs. 
Non-involved 
Second stage 
Private and 
public recap 
vs. Targets 
Third Stage 
Public vs. 
private recap 
 
H
p 
1 
ROA 1.047 
(0.020) 
3.684 
(0.040) 
42.608 
(0.723) 
-0.385 
(0.003) 
10.593 
(0.292) 
38.718 
(0.608) 
NIM 3.165 
(2.310) 
17.341** 
(6.003) 
-9.844 
(0.144) 
1.330 
(0.325) 
20.768*** 
(6.554) 
-14.201 
(0.292) 
FCFR -0.005 
(0.084) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.109) 
0.004 
(0.029) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.029 
(0.185) 
CTI -0.016 
(0.002) 
0.217 
(0.048) 
4.491** 
(3.881) 
-0.018 
(0.002) 
0.190 
(0.029) 
4.825** 
(4.285) 
GROWTH 0.788** 
(5.018) 
0.992 
(1.464) 
1.225 
(0.397) 
0.950** 
(5.954) 
0.664 
(0.518) 
1.102 
(0.303) 
H
p 
2 
 
EQUITY -8.052** 
(5.617) 
-5.910 
(0.593) 
-15.472 
(0.302) 
-7.513** 
(4.000) 
-2.283 
(0.073) 
-19.130 
(0.449) 
NCO -13.879 
(1.742) 
4.447 
(0.036) 
-34.953 
(0.160) 
-11.727 
(1.020) 
2.837 
(0.012) 
12.407 
(0.017) 
LIQ -2.060** 
(4.752) 
1.109 
(0.230) 
-14.442*** 
(8.468) 
-1.786* 
(2.756) 
5.013 
(2.624) 
-14.790*** 
(8.703) 
LIQ*EQ 16.535 
(2.016) 
5.914 
(0.044) 
82.889 
(1.102) 
9.115 
(0.462) 
32.792 
(0.941) 
80.016 
(1.020) 
Co
n
tr
o
ls 
LnTA 0.029 
(0.397) 
0.052 
(0.281) 
1.547*** 
(16.564) 
0.037 
(0.518) 
0.111 
(1.020) 
1.529*** 
(15.920) 
PRICE_CH -0.098 
(0.270) 
-0.022 
(0.004) 
-0.868 
(2.132) 
-0.149 
(0.548) 
-0.098 
(0.063) 
-0.834 
(2.016) 
EC_FREE 0.021 
(0.922) 
-0.069 
(2.624) 
-0.136 
(1.346) 
0.040* 
(2.756) 
-0.108** 
(4.666) 
-0.168 
(1.877) 
REG_Q -0.204 
(0.436) 
1.045 
(2.592) 
3.893** 
(3.881) 
-0.551 
(2.465) 
1.507** 
(4.203) 
4.282** 
(4.452) 
CLAIMS 0.003** 
(5.905) 
0.002 
(0.348) 
0.013** 
(5.382) 
0.004*** 
(7.290) 
0.002 
(0.360) 
0.013** 
(5.244) 
GDPG -0.038** 
(4.973) 
-0.084** 
(5.382) 
-0.383*** 
(13.250) 
-0.038** 
(4.244) 
-0.103*** 
(6.605) 
-0.379*** 
(12.320) 
EU -0.578*** 
(8.526) 
-0.019 
(0.003) 
-0.503 
(0.348) 
-0.609*** 
(7.896) 
-0.194 
(0.230) 
-0.584 
(0.462) 
 Intercept -2.038 
(1.716) 
3.103 
(1.020) 
-28.246*** 
(10.176) 
-3.114* 
(3.240) 
3.680 
(1.166) 
-25.881*** 
(8.180) 
 N. targets  83 - 
N. (private and public) recap 250 - 
N. private recap - 209 
N. public recap - 41 
N. non-involved 883 726 
Chi-square 193.83*** 195.81*** 
Variables (as defined in Table 1) refer to the year prior to the deal. Wald tests are in parentheses. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 
the Wald tests at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The N is the number of observations.  The chi-square is a goodness of fit test that indicates how 
well the logistic regression model fits the data.  
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Table 6 Robustness tests on the methodology 
Hp Variables (lagged 
values by 1 year) 
Panel A. Bootstrap multinomial 
logistic 
Full period all sample  
Panel B. Cox regression 
Full period all sample  
  Target Private 
recap 
Public 
recap 
Target Private 
recap 
Public recap 
H
p 
1 
ROA 4.116 
(0.109) 
2.725 
(0.160) 
9.490 
(0.096) 
0.945 
(0.198) 
4.492** 
(5.040) 
13.253 
(1.402) 
NIM -9.489* 
(2.890) 
4.847** 
(4.666) 
5.657 
(0.096) 
-2.205* 
(2.913) 
0.958** 
(3.792) 
-3.694 
(0.399) 
FCFR -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.053) 
0.054 
(1.210) 
-0.003 
(0.297) 
-0.002 
(0.204) 
0.012 
(1.192) 
CTI -0.097 
(0.020) 
-0.346 
(0.260) 
1.003 
(1.613) 
-0.093 
(0.400) 
-0.006 
(0.002) 
0.307 
(0.833) 
GROWTH 0.170 
(0.096) 
0.791* 
(3.460) 
2.760** 
(4.752) 
0.118 
(0.974) 
0.181** 
(3.774) 
0.464* 
(2.877) 
H
p 
2 
 
EQUITY -4.068 
(0.348) 
-8.298* 
(3.460) 
-0.065 
(0.001) 
-1.879 
(2.669) 
-1.820** 
(4.711) 
-3.667 
(0.426) 
NCO -12.771 
(0.314) 
-6.484 
(0.336) 
-70.087 
(1.742) 
2.209 
(0.428) 
2.869 
(1.304) 
8.419 
(0.129) 
LIQ -2.804 
(0.922) 
-1.260 
(1.232) 
-5.135* 
(2.822) 
-0.627 
(2.298) 
-0.146 
(0.329) 
-1.170 
(1.496) 
LIQ*EQ 19.678 
(0.449) 
10.867 
(0.518) 
-27.620 
(0.203) 
7.339* 
(2.752) 
-0.181 
(0.003) 
15.888 
(0.597) 
 
Co
n
tr
o
ls 
LnTA -0.019 
(0.058) 
-0.053 
(0.792) 
1.259*** 
(10.890) 
-0.024*  
(2.701) 
-0.018 
(2.419) 
0.284*** 
(10.792) 
PRICE_CH -0.187 
(0.336) 
-0.078 
(0.09) 
-0.902 
(1.145) 
0.050 
(0.687) 
0.020 
(0.132) 
-0.398*** 
(9.371) 
EC_FREE 0.054 
(2.132) 
-0.009 
(0.123) 
-0.032 
(0.230) 
0.013* 
(3.445) 
-0.008 
(0.945) 
-0.022 
(0.788) 
REG_Q -0.677 
(1.742) 
0.181 
(0.260) 
2.425** 
(5.905) 
-0.190* 
(4.238) 
0.060 
(0.446) 
0.638 
(2.385) 
CLAIMS 0.003 
(1.124) 
0.002 
(1.210) 
0.011** 
(4.928) 
0.001 
(0.702) 
0.001 
(1.033) 
0.003** 
(4.496) 
GDPG 0.020 
(0.423) 
-0.041* 
(2.856) 
-0.328*** 
(12.603) 
0.007 
(1.064) 
-0.008** 
(4.449) 
-0.057** 
(4.883) 
EU -0.657** 
(4.040) 
-0.584** 
(4.410) 
-0.813 
(1.464) 
-0.055 
(1.072) 
-0.136** 
(5.179) 
-0.024 
(0.020) 
 Intercept -3.958 
(2.403) 
0.720 
(0.090) 
-28.769*** 
(8.703) 
   
 N. targets 83 104 - - 
 N. private recap 209 - 198 - 
N. public recap 41 - - 40 
N. non-involved 883 1609 1119 1119 
Chi-square 430.37*** 23.270* 36.776*** 93.229*** 
Nagelkerke R2 0.1092    
Variables (as defined in Table 1) refer to the year prior to the deal. Wald test are in parentheses. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 
the Wald tests at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The N is the number of observations. The chi-square is a goodness of fit test that indicates how 
well the regression model fits the data. The Nagelkerke's R2 is a pseudo-R2 that indicates the power of the explanation in the multinomial logistic model 
(Nagelkerke, 1991).    
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Table 7 Robustness tests on the sample and category specification  
Hp Variables (lagged 
values by 1 year) 
Panel A. Restricted to domestic activities  
EU domestic sample  
Panel B. Category controlling for the 
nature of recapitalizations  
Full  sample   
  Full period Crisis Full period 
  Target Private 
recap 
Public 
recap 
Target Private 
recap 
Public 
recap 
Target 
only 
Private 
recap only 
Private 
recap and 
target 
H
p 
1 
ROA 9.217 
(0.160) 
9.797 
(0.722) 
19.290 
(0.311) 
2.908 
(0.017) 
-11.659 
(0.941) 
8.140 
(0.036) 
17.458 
(1.229) 
7.887 
(0.790) 
-15.817 
(0.385) 
NIM -12.990** 
(3.960) 
2.950* 
(1.823) 
8.937 
(1.020) 
-23.434* 
(3.098) 
1.1017 
(0.130) 
8.579 
(0.410) 
-19.214** 
(4.721) 
4.586** 
(4.340) 
5.738 
(0.402) 
FCFR -0.038 
(1.346) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
0.043 
(1.932) 
-0.024 
(0.260) 
0.021 
(0.410) 
0.044 
(0.884) 
-0.018 
(0.260) 
-0.013 
(0.343) 
0.069 
(0.907) 
CTI 0.018 
(0.001) 
-1.239* 
(3.276) 
0.654 
(0.462) 
-0.225 
(0.044) 
-1.174* 
(2.592) 
0.483 
(0.144) 
0.225 
(0.078) 
-0.070 
(0.019) 
-0.430 
(0.073) 
GROWTH -0.613 
(0.476) 
0.891* 
(3.276) 
2.403*** 
(19.714) 
-0.070 
(0.005) 
1.039* 
(3.423) 
2.300* 
(3.276) 
-0.027 
(0.002) 
0.815** 
(4.268) 
1.250 
(0.951) 
H
p 
2 
 
EQUITY -4.078 
(0.397) 
-16.104** 
(3.881) 
2.765 
(0.053) 
-1.829 
(0.040) 
-11.862* 
(3.610) 
4.674 
(0.044) 
-5.966 
(0.773) 
-9.713** 
(5.310) 
-19.667 
(1.793) 
NCO -2.827 
(0.008) 
-6.110 
(0.292) 
-33.729 
(2.496) 
-5.127 
(0.032) 
-5.662 
(0.102) 
-1.645 
(0.001) 
16-372 
(0.615) 
-2.213 
(0.032) 
-86.488* 
(3.162) 
LIQ -3.251 
(0.773) 
-1.574 
 (0.518) 
-7.994*** 
(6.970) 
-4.031 
(1.277) 
0.018 
(0.001) 
-7.863* 
(3.312) 
-3.141 
(2.258) 
-1.583 
(1.871) 
-8.538* 
(3.518) 
LIQ*EQ 16.326 
(0.096) 
51.201* 
(3.063) 
-0.562 
(0.001) 
-2.111 
(0.003) 
25.943 
(1.346) 
-0.098 
(0.001) 
37.904 
(2.392) 
15.940 
(1.090) 
63.257 
(1.519) 
Co
n
tr
o
ls 
LnTA -0.100  
(0.624) 
-0.182  
(2.403) 
1.458*** 
(12.041) 
-0.171 
(1.392) 
-0.170** 
(4.244) 
1.467*** 
(17.893) 
-0.022 
(0.062) 
-0.029 
(0.284) 
0.172 
(0.824) 
PRICE_CH -0.143 
(0.137) 
0.018 
(0.006) 
-0.756 
(1.638) 
-0.071 
(0.020) 
-0.127 
(0.168) 
-0.648 
(1.124) 
-0.156 
(0.162) 
-0.041 
(0.037) 
-0.649 
(0.703) 
EC_FREE 0.007 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.348) 
0.121 
(1.124) 
0.035 
(0.270) 
0.049 
 (1.513) 
0.151 
(1.742) 
0.025 
(0.375) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.094 
(1.437) 
REG_Q -0.529 
(0.624) 
-0.660 
(0.656) 
1.250 
(0.533) 
-0.536 
(0.281) 
-0.848 
(1.664) 
1.146 
(0.410) 
-0.484 
(0.709) 
0.055 
(0.024) 
-0.850 
(0.599) 
CLAIMS 0.005 
(1.416) 
0.004* 
(3.460) 
-0.006 
(0.292) 
0.005 
(1.742) 
0.004* 
(3.098) 
-0.009 
(1.538) 
0.004 
(2.093) 
0.003* 
(2.791) 
-0.002 
(0.145) 
GDPG -0.015 
(0.068) 
-0.049*** 
(8.644) 
-0.312*** 
(6.864) 
-0.028 
(0.325) 
-0.048 
(2.560) 
-0.290*** 
(11.903) 
0.030 
(0.650) 
-0.043** 
(4.888) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
EU - - - - - - -0.539 
(2.153) 
-0.528** 
(5.437) 
-1.071 
(2.439) 
 Intercept -0.338 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-39.630*** 
(11.628) 
-0.469 
(0.008) 
-0.367 
(0.014) 
-41.269*** 
(19.360) 
-2.557 
(0.760) 
0.176 
(0.010) 
-9.514 
(2.559) 
 N. targets 43 38 62 
 N. private recap 133 112 211 
 N. public recap 31 31 - 
 N. private recap and  
targets 
- - 16 
N. non-involved 620 536 830 
Chi-square 71.602*** 151.84*** 67.09** 
Nagelkerke R2 0.1231 0.135 0.075 
Variables (as defined in Table 1) refer to the year prior to the deal. Wald test are in parentheses. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 
the Wald tests at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The N is the number of observations. The chi-square is a goodness of fit test that indicates how 
well the regression model fits the data. The Nagelkerke's R2 is a pseudo-R2 that indicates the power of the explanation in the multinomial logistic 
model (Nagelkerke, 1991). 
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Table 8 Predictive accuracy of the multinomial logistic regression 
Panel A 
Portfolios Targets Non-Targets Private recap Non-private recap Public recap Non-public recap 
LPP 24 591 87 528 0 615 
HPP 61 554 134 481 41 574 
 85 1145 221 1009 41 1189 
Pearson’s 2 41.6*** 27.2*** 103.9*** 
Likelihood Ratio 2 7.8*** 5.3*** ∞*** 
Panel B 
 Estimation subsample Validation subsample 
Portfolios Targets Private recap Public recap Targets Private recap Public recap 
LPP 7 17 0 6 22 0 
MPP 5 31 0 10 19 1 
HPP 25 58 17 15 30 23 
Overall 37 106 17 31 71 24 
Pearson’s 2 15.31*** 22.76*** 
Number of correct predictions. HPP is the portfolio with the highest probability of an event taking place. MPP is the portfolio with a 
medium probability of an event taking place. LPP is the portfolio with the lowest probability of an event taking place. 
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Highlights for Review 
 
 
• Takeovers and recapitalizations are potential alternatives used to shore up banks. 
• Takeovers are more likely when banks experience low margins. 
• Private recapitalizations are more likely with lower equity and higher margins. 
• Public recapitalizations are more likely for larger and less liquid banks. 
• These determinants differ widely pre-crisis from during the crisis.  
 
